



Interinstitutional cooperation as a driver of improved military mobility in Europe

Simon Van Hoeymissen¹

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the need for rapid and large-scale movement of military equipment and troops across Europe lost a lot of political attention. In subsequent decades, savings on military mobility were part of the peace dividend. However, since 2017, and especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, military mobility in Europe has been high on the agenda again. The logistics chain bringing military equipment to Ukraine illustrates the complexity of the challenges involved. All sorts of players who are not under direct government control have taken a more prominent role in military mobility since the end of the Cold War. Given reduced demand, many commercially driven actors have scaled back their military equipment transport capabilities. For example, train operators such as DB Schenker² no longer have the necessary number of wagons capable of transporting heavy armoured vehicles³. As a result of this evolution, military mobility today requires a complex set of interactions and partnerships between organisations with different mindsets, motivations, capabilities and cultures. Coordination and communication between all actors are needed not only for greater efficiency, but also to minimise the

¹ Researcher on European security and defence architecture. The views expressed in this document are those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Belgian Defence or the Royal Higher Institute for Defence.

² The privatisation of DB Schenker is currently ongoing. Gregor Gowans, "Report: Deutsche Bahn selects 3 banks to run sale of Schenker," *Trans.info*, March 9, 2023, <https://trans.info/report-330457>.

³ Jürgen Felies (lieutenant colonel and Belgian military mobility expert), interview by author, Brussels, June 5, 2023.

potential damage and inconvenience of military transport. Improving military mobility requires a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach⁴ and is a particularly interesting test case of civil-military, private-public, international and EU-NATO cooperation.

The role of the EU

The EU has promoted and facilitated significant progress on military mobility since 2017. One of the first priorities was to identify areas for improvement. To this end, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), in consultation with NATO⁵, identified four military requirements. First, the transport infrastructure in certain corridors needs to be upgraded in order to carry the heavy weight of some military vehicles. Second, the procedures for obtaining a cross-border movement permission (CBMP) must become more efficient. This includes the approval military vehicles and personnel must obtain to cross borders. The goal is to deliver CBMPs within five working days (although NATO aims for a much faster, but not publicly known, granting process among its members)⁶. The EU also calls upon its Member States to provide a national contact point to facilitate this faster procedure. A third priority is to improve customs and excise procedures. Finally, the management and transport of hazardous substances should be optimised⁷. To maintain coherence within all the necessary work, after a first Action Plan on Military Mobility (APMM) in 2018, the EU published a second one in 2022, whose provisions must be implemented by 2026. To fund infrastructure projects that improve military mobility, EU Member States can use the transport component of the second Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). This part of the CEF provides EUR 25.8 billion of the EU budget for the period 2021-2027, of which EUR 1.69 billion is specifically reserved for military mobility⁸. The first project call in 2021 selected 22 projects for European co-financing worth EUR 339 million. The European Commission announced at the end of 2022 that it would co-finance 35 military mobility projects through the CEF for a total amount of EUR 616 million⁹, of which over EUR 60 million will go to Belgian projects¹⁰. Almost EUR 31 million have been earmarked for upgrading and expanding marshalling and shunting rail yards in the port of Antwerp, while the other EUR 30 million will go to finishing the E34 motorway between Antwerp and Zeebrugge¹¹. In total, EUR 790 million have been allocated to the 2023 project

⁴ Margriet Drent, Kimberley Kruijver, and Dick Zandee, *Military Mobility and the EU-NATO Conundrum* (The Hague: Clingendael, 2019), https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/Military_Mobility_and_the_EU_NATO_Conundrum.pdf.

⁵ Drent, Kruijver, and Zandee, *Military Mobility*.

⁶ Curtis Michael Scaparrotti, Colleen Bradley Bell, Wayne Schroeder, Clementine G. Starling, and Conor Rodihan, *Moving Out: A Comprehensive Assessment of European Military Mobility* (Washington: Atlantic Council, 2020), https://atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Moving-Out_Military-Mobility-Web.pdf.

⁷ Michaël Nuyens, "Militaire Mobiliteit in beweging in Europa," *Belgian Military Review*, no. 20 (December 2020): 107-116, <https://www.defence-institute.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/rmb-20-art-08.pdf>.


⁸ European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency, "Transport infrastructure: EU allocates further EUR 616 million to civilian-defence dual-use investments on the Trans-European Transport Network," European Commission, December 21, 2022, https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/transport-infrastructure-eu-allocates-further-eur-616-million-civilian-defence-dual-use-investments-2022-12-21_en.

⁹ DG MOVE, "EU transport infrastructure: speeding-up investment in military mobility," European Commission, December 21, 2022, https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/eu-transport-infrastructure-speeding-investment-military-mobility-2022-12-21_en.

¹⁰ "EU gives Belgium over €60 million to improve 'problematic' military mobility," *The Brussels Times*, January 6, 2023, <https://www.brusselstimes.com/347619/belgium-receives-tens-of-millions-to-improve-problematic-military-transport>.

¹¹ "België krijgt ruim 60 miljoen euro van Europa om wegen en spoor aan te passen voor zwaar militair materieel," *VRT*, January 5, 2023, <https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2023/01/05/steun-europese-unie-militair-materieel/>.

call¹². This European support is subject to specific conditions with a view to dual-use opportunities. Infrastructure projects claiming CEF co-financing must be part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). The TEN-T comprises nine corridors, as shown below in different colours.



Trans-European Transport Network¹³

¹² DG MOVE, "EU transport infrastructure: EUR 790 million available for military mobility," European Commission, May 3, 2023, https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/eu-transport-infrastructure-eur-790-million-available-military-mobility-2023-05-03_en.

¹³ European Commission, "Trans-European Transport Network," accessed July 24, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/site/maps_upload/SchematicA0_EUcorridor_map.pdf.

Projects that improve military mobility without also benefitting civilian traffic should be fully funded by the EU Member States themselves¹⁴. This does not appear to be common: although initially the TEN-T was primarily civilian-inspired, the APMM 2.0 states that 93 per cent of military transport requirements coincide with civilian routes¹⁵. The European Defence Agency (EDA) too facilitates cooperation between member states on military mobility through various avenues and helps to homogenise military cultures between EU Member States. In 2021, the EDA established two technical arrangements (TA) that clarify the administrative procedures to be followed when crossing borders and allow the parties involved to achieve the desired military objective in a coordinated manner. In the application of customs regulations, the handling of mixed civil-military convoys in particular appears to pose practical difficulties due to differences in the procedures to be followed, which may result in certain elements of a convoy being released faster than others¹⁶. The EDA has developed shared standard procedures for customs regulations, allowing for harmonisation of national interpretations of international law. To consolidate complementarity between the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and EU customs legislation on the one hand and NATO's on the other, an EU version of the Form 302 already used in NATO transport¹⁷ was developed. Finally, the EDA also has a project team 'Movement & Transport', in which Member States and third states can exchange information on their planned and ongoing activities on military mobility¹⁸. Building on the EDA's coordinating work, the two Permanent Structured Cooperation Projects (PESCO) on military mobility (led by the Netherlands) and logistics hubs (led by Germany) – in which Belgium in both cases also participates – ensure that participating countries keep improvements on the large-scale reception and transport of military equipment and personnel on the agenda¹⁹. Finally, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) categorised military mobility as one of six focus areas for future European cooperation in capability development. Specifically, the CARD makes recommendations to improve resilience, air and sea transport capabilities and logistics²⁰. In summary, when it comes to improving military mobility in the EU, the EUMS says what to do, the APMM 2.0 explains how to tackle it, the CEF co-funds improvements in transport infrastructure, the TEN-T frames it, the EDA facilitates cooperation between Member States, the PESCO projects keep the topic on Member States' political agendas and the CARD monitors progress.

For Belgium, this coordination and these partnerships within the EU are particularly important because of its central location and the presence of the EU and NATO on its territory²¹. In a reply to the Belgian parliamentary Committee on National Defence²², the minister of Defence emphasised Belgium's commitment to military mobility. She pointed to the pioneering role of the Belgian Defence

¹⁴ Scaparrotti, Bell, Schroeder, Starling, and Rodihan, *Moving Out*.

¹⁵ High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, *Joint communication to the European parliament and the council. Action plan on military mobility 2.0* (Brussels: European Commission, 2022), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022JC0048&from=EN>.

¹⁶ Felies, interview.

¹⁷ DG TAXUD, "Customs Transit: NATO and other military activities," European Commission, accessed July 17, 2023, https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/customs-4/customs-procedures-import-and-export-0/what-customs-transit/customs-transit-nato-and-other-military-activities_en.

¹⁸ "Military Mobility," European Defence Agency, April 27, 2021, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2021-04-27-factsheet-military-mobility.pdf>.

¹⁹ Drent, Kruijver, and Zandee, *Military Mobility*.

²⁰ European Defence Agency, "Military Mobility."

²¹ Michaël Nuyens, "Militaire Mobiliteit in beweging in Europa," *Belgian Military Review*, no. 20 (December 2020): 107-116, <https://www.defence-institute.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/rmb-20-art-08.pdf>.


²² Committee on National Defence, *Integraal verslag met vertaald beknopt verslag/Compte rendu intégral avec compte rendu analytique traduit*, CRIV 55 COM 1034, Brussels: Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 2023, <https://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/55/ic1034.pdf>.

within the Cross-Border Movement Permissions working group and the proposal drawn up by Defence to further concretise the technical agreements. In addition, Belgium is actively participating in the development of a network of national contact points to dealing with targeted and/or urgent applications in a rapid manner. Furthermore, the minister pointed out that Defence, in consultation with the relevant authorities, issued a reasoned opinion on the military added value of projects that were eligible for CEF funding, after which this dossier could be submitted to the European Commission. “These are projects that mainly aim to increase capacity in transport hubs or on traffic axes or that involve adapting infrastructure to military requirements, e.g., adapting bridges.”²³ To this end, Defence holds regular inter-ministerial consultations with all stakeholders involved. Finally, the minister stated that Belgium attaches importance to the rapprochement of both PESCO projects, “given the importance of developing a hub and spoke network to respond to the issue of military mobility.”²⁴

EU-NATO cooperation on military mobility

The elaboration of all these mechanisms within the EU is facilitated by the fact that military mobility is also a flagship of EU-NATO cooperation²⁵. The 2017 EU joint communication on military mobility and the two military mobility action plans highlight the importance of cooperation with NATO. In December 2017, military mobility was included as an area in which cooperation between both organisations would be strengthened through specific actions²⁶. The Russian invasion of Ukraine brought home the sense of urgency of this issue for both organisations. Both the EU Strategic Compass²⁷ and the NATO Strategic Concept²⁸ describe improvements in military mobility as a priority.

TIMELINE OF KEY DEVELOPMENTS



Milestones in EU-NATO cooperation on military mobility²⁹

²³ Committee on National Defence, *Integraal verslag*, 13.

²⁴ Committee on National Defence, *Integraal verslag*, 14.

²⁵ European Defence Agency, “Military Mobility,” March 31, 2022, <https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-03/Factsheet%20-%20Military%20Mobility.pdf>.

²⁶ “Relations with the European Union,” NATO, accessed July 28, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm.

²⁷ “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,” European External Action Service, accessed July 17, 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en.

²⁸ “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” NATO, June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.

²⁹ Mihai Sebastian Chihaiia, “Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle,” *European Policy Centre*, April 11, 2023, https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2023/Military_mobility_PB.pdf.

A core aspect of cooperation on military mobility concerns the exchange of information³⁰. For instance, in the case of concrete transport, data on the numbers, nature and number plates of vehicles must be communicated between numerous actors involved. Information is also needed at the political level. For example, NATO has shared its military requirements for infrastructure and its standards for the transport of dangerous goods with the EU. This information sharing between both organisations is remarkable in the light of traditional challenges in this area. They are often grounded in the difference between NATO's classification culture and the EU's more open, legalistic approach³¹. As regards military mobility, the EU and NATO have shared interests, their respective strengths complement each other well and certain political obstacles at the member-state level have less influence³². This enables these organisations to cooperate through different channels. The EDA has developed administrative arrangements that allow third states to collaborate on projects. Involving the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway as members of the PESCO project on military mobility has created an inclusive format in which information and lessons learnt can be shared. Although these third states do not have decision-making rights within the project, their membership offers great added value by allowing them to share their extensive experience on mobility issues with the other members³³. Besides this formal cooperation, there are also informal contacts between both organisations through their military staffs and at the diplomatic level between the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) and NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC). The APMM 2.0 also describes the ambition of the European External Action Service, the European Commission and the EDA to use multinational exercises to train the deployment and provisioning of units and to conduct parallel and coordinated EU-NATO exercises³⁴.

The political aspects of military mobility

We can thus attribute the significant progress made by the EU, NATO and their member states since 2017 on cooperation in military mobility to a combination of shared interests, complementary strengths, the absence of certain traditional challenges in interagency cooperation and the renewed threat posed by Russian irredentism and revisionism. It mainly owes its success to military staffs, diplomats, technocrats and commercial actors. In the PESCO project, a small number of experts in working groups often did a lot of moulding to determine the way forward, after which the other member states could join in. Nevertheless, different dynamics can lead to greater politicisation of military mobility issues. This carries the risk that national sensibilities could induce some Member States to adopt a more intransigent and less constructive stance. This could complicate cooperation between all actors involved, both at the political level and in concrete transport.

³⁰ Felies, interview.


³¹ Drent, Kruijver, and Zandee, *Military Mobility*.

³² In her study on the role of member states in EU-NATO cooperation, Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters links the difficulties related to sharing secure information between these organisations in a context of tensions between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. In terms of military mobility, the latter factor already seems to be less of a factor. Turkey, Cyprus and Greece are not part of strategic corridors and thus have few interests at stake in terms of military transport infrastructure. Moreover, they benefit from the increased focus on military mobility: Cyprus is interested in participating in the TEN-T and Turkey has received EU funding to better connect its railway system to the TEN-T. (Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, *Understanding EU-NATO cooperation: How Member States matter* (London: Routledge, 2021), p. 170.)

³³ Felies, interview.

³⁴ Mihai Sebastian Chihai, "Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle," *European Policy Centre*, April 11, 2023, https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2023/Military_mobility_PB.pdf.

A first possible driver of politicisation stems from the progress that Member States involved in the PESCO military mobility project are making in drafting and implementing national action plans, as the deadline approaches (i.e., 2024). Moving from abstract goals to concrete projects sharpens the national and local interests at stake. Each country in the PESCO project is soon going to have to make choices about the infrastructure projects to which they will allocate funds. Those investments require national and local political support. The outcome of those political considerations is not necessarily fully in line with the military plans and timelines drawn up. Although Belgium is one of the most active members within the PESCO project, our ambitions are subject to the political necessity of balancing public investment between the north and south of the country. Consultations between the respective cabinets involved are expected to take place by the end of 2023³⁵. However, with the 2024 elections ahead, it remains to be seen to what extent political realities will make such agreements possible. Some negotiations are also proving difficult at the international level. For instance, Austria is located at the crossroads of several strategic corridors. However, the country is not a NATO member and has a very challenging geography, which makes upgrading its transport infrastructure to military standards no mean feat, both politically and financially³⁶. Negotiations between Belgium and the Netherlands on sharing the costs and nuisance of the Iron Rhine railway project³⁷ are also proving difficult, despite the pioneering role both countries play in improving military mobility in Europe.



The Iron Rhine railway³⁸

³⁵ Felies, interview.

³⁶ Margriet, Kruijver, and Zandee, *Military Mobility*.

³⁷ Kamiel Vermeylen, "IJzeren Rijn-spoorlijn: 15 keer meer voordelen voor België, Nederland ligt dwars," *Knack*, August 4, 2023, <https://www.knack.be/nieuws/wereld/europa/ijs-eren-rijn-spoorlijn-15-keer-meer-voordelen-voor-belgie-nederland-ligt-dwars/>.

³⁸ Vermeylen, "IJzeren Rijn-spoorlijn".

Political difficulties related to cost-sharing also influence the expansion of a new patrimony of railway wagons capable of carrying military vehicles. Both the EU and NATO want to build this capacity, but the current military wagons cannot simply be used for civilian purposes. Possible solutions include pooling military wagons between different Member States or developing new, multipurpose wagons³⁹. However, there is often a lack of resources available for this. The EU, NATO and member states should therefore agree on financing and coordinating the development and acquisition of new wagons.

Another possible driver of politicisation of military mobility is the deteriorating security situation in certain areas on the periphery of the European security architecture. This may present mobility challenges that fall outside the conceptual overlap of NATO and the EU in the context of the logistics chain bringing aid to Ukraine. Indeed, NATO and the EU place slightly different nuances in their definitions of military mobility. NATO considers military mobility “less as a stand-alone project and more as an important force enabler of Alliance-wide activities and operations in support of its defense and deterrence mission. . . NATO’s focus is on using mobility to support combat capabilities and logistics, drawing heavily on operational responsiveness in mobility planning”⁴⁰. NATO thus approaches this project from its deterrence and defence doctrine (Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area, DDA). The EU emphasises other parts of its definition of military mobility: “[T]he movement of military personnel and assets from one place to another, including crossing borders by using different modes of transport”⁴¹. The emphasis here is on the importance of transport infrastructure (for dual use) and capabilities (the possibility of dual use). This is in line with the EU’s traditional focus in its neighbourhood policy on comprehensive guarantee, economic development and integration with the rest of Europe. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine made EU and NATO priorities converge around the need for the smooth supply of military equipment and personnel from the west to the east. This strengthens both the EU’s strategic autonomy and NATO’s collective defence. However, military mobility does not just facilitate a logistics chain; it also determines the planning and execution of EU and NATO missions and operations. Performing transport infrastructure supports collective defence, as internal lines can be made full use of. While better transport infrastructure also makes crisis management operations and training missions easier, manoeuvre warfare can require much larger-scale troop movements and a more intensive use of infrastructure than the EU needs (and has available) for its CSDP. For example, the Clingendael Institute argued in 2019 that NATO was working on military mobility at the brigade level rather than at the level of EU battlegroups⁴². The size of the moving units, for instance, plays a role in providing overnight accommodation.

Should the security situation deteriorate in certain areas on NATO or EU external borders, it is possible that differences in the nature of activities, objectives and approaches of both organisations will come to the fore. For example, investments in transport infrastructure between Romania and Moldova could support the economic development of this region and facilitate NATO’s defence and supply of these countries. In contrast, this could also make the Focșani Gate more accessible to Russian forces from Transnistria. A similar challenge arises regarding the Russian threat to the border area between Poland and Lithuania, the Suwałki Pass. Both the Via Baltica highway (which is being upgraded with

³⁹ Felies, interview.

⁴⁰ Scaparrotti, Bell, Schroeder, Starling, and Rodihan, *Moving Out*.

⁴¹ “23 Member States sign new military mobility programme,” European Defence Agency, May 14, 2019, <https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2019/05/14/22-member-states-sign-new-military-mobility-programme>.

⁴² An EU battlegroup is generally built around a battalion of about 1,500 troops, while a NATO brigade usually comprises about 5,000 soldiers (Drent, Kruijver, and Zandee, *Military Mobility*).

financial support from the CEF⁴³ and the Three Seas Initiative (3SI⁴⁴) and the Rail Baltica (the only railway connection between Lithuania and Poland in European standard railway track gauge and co-financed by the CEF) connect to the rest of the TEN-T on this particular spot. The infrastructure running through the Suwałki Gap supports the economic integration of the Baltic states with the rest of the EU, but it is exposed to security threats from Kaliningrad and Belarus. While these transport routes improve NATO's defensive position, more room for manoeuvre in the densely forested areas near Kaliningrad could also lead to increased uncertainty among Russian forces and drive escalating dynamics locally. A third challenging area is the Balkans. EU and NATO relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina must balance mobility as a driver of economic development with its impact on the precarious domestic political and (para)military balance. The upgrading of transport infrastructure in these areas needs to be embedded in a coherent and resilient whole. This requires a lot of coordination between the EU, NATO, national and regional governments as well as small-scale investment formats such as the Three Seas Initiative (3SI)⁴⁵. To support collective defence, the EU should align its investments in dual-use transport infrastructure with the regional responsibility zones provided by NATO. The joint EU-NATO exercises cited in the APMM 2.0 would be an interesting mechanism to train this coordination in practice. Here, NATO's Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) in Ulm could be responsible for coordinating northern and eastern mobility towards the Allied Joint Forces Command (JFC) Brunssum responsibility zone, and southward mobility towards the zone under the responsibility of JFC Naples⁴⁶.

Conclusion

The possible drivers of the politicisation of military mobility we have cited are often grounded in specific local or national contexts. However, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Since military mobility relies on efficient cooperation between NATO, the EU, their member states and the private sector, small and local issues can have a very broad impact. The politicisation of this issue, in particular, can complicate information flow. Losing control over information is a traditional stumbling block within EU-NATO cooperation. While this is currently less of a factor in military mobility, it remains a potentially sensitive issue given the multitude of government departments and companies involved in military transport. Administrative simplification and efficiency should not come at the expense of control over sensitive information that ensures the resilience and protection of troop movements. The politicisation of military mobility also requires paying attention to the risk of duplication of capabilities between the EU and NATO. Many military transport capabilities (e.g., wagons) are obsolete or saved away and need to be rebuilt. An unclear division of roles and tasks would give member states room to interpret the roles of both organisations according to national preferences, which could undermine the coherence of cooperation. Again, this seems less of an issue in the case of military mobility.

⁴³ Lithuanian Ministry of Transport and Communications, "Lithuania to Receive Another EUR 46 Million in EU Support to Improve Military Mobility Connections with Europe," Government of the Republic of Lithuania, December 23, 2022, <https://sumin.lrv.lt/en/news/lithuania-to-receive-another-eur-46-million-in-eu-support-to-improve-military-mobility-connections-with-europe>.

⁴⁴ Matthew Thomas, "Greater Regional Investment and Security Cooperation: Latvian Priorities for the Three Seas Initiative," Warsaw Institute, February 9, 2023, <https://warsawinstitute.org/greater-regional-investment-and-security-cooperation-latvian-priorities-for-the-three-seas-initiative/>.

⁴⁵ "Verbatim report of proceedings: 16. The Three Seas Initiative: challenges and opportunities (topical debate)," European Parliament, July 6, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-07-06-ITM-016_EN.html.

⁴⁶ Felies, interview.

Working together in this field allows both organisations to highlight their strengths. The EU uses its regulatory and economic weight to plan and finance transport infrastructure. The initially civilian-inspired TEN-T is for the most part in accordance with military requirements. The EU is also pushing for simpler administration, compatible with NATO (e.g., by developing its own version of the customs form 302). For its part, NATO provides the necessary protection and increases the resilience of the logistics chain. In addition, the Alliance can coordinate transport from the JSEC. A more pronounced role for the EU in multinational NATO exercises will help put this cooperation into practice in the future. Nevertheless, it is important to pay attention to the differences between EU and NATO approaches, objectives and activities, on the periphery of the European security architecture. The upgrading of transport infrastructure can fuel economic growth and political convergence, and improve the defensive position of NATO allies. However, at the Alliance's and Union's borders, overlapping ideas on military mobility can also run into their limits.



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