On 3 September 2025, China marked the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II with a military parade that, for the first time, displayed its full nuclear triad. Alongside new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs, namely DF-61 and DF-31BJ), the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and the JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), Beijing also showcased advanced conventional systems, thereby reinforcing its drive toward long-range precision strikes and nuclear credibility against the United States.
The event strongly contrasted with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, which highlighted fragile multilateral ambitions undermined by internal rivalries. Xi Jinping’s martial rhetoric underlined the shift from universalist discourse to reliance on hard power.
Despite modernisation and massive exercises, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains untested in high-intensity war since 1979, raising doubts about its resilience. China’s posture thus combines growing military strength with unproven effectiveness and limited capacity to unite strategic partners.
(Only available in French)
Research lines: Defence capabilities and technologies ; Indo-Pacific
© Xinhua News (Zhang Yuwei) via le ministère de la Défense nationale chinois