Europe’s post-Cold War deterrence model was built for peacetime efficiency: small, highly trained forces; scarce, high‑end platforms; and precision munitions procured in limited quantities – well suited to expeditionary operations and short campaigns. Ukraine’s situation is exposing the fragility of that logic. In a high-intensity territorial defence, battlefield excellence does matter, but it’s endurance that decides. The side that demonstrates the greater capacity to absorb losses, replace equipment, generate and expand formations and continue fighting under sustained fire eventually prevails.
Attrition turns industrial output into strategy. Credible deterrence against a peer adversary now rests on scalable industrial endurance – namely, the ability to secure inputs, produce and replenish at speed and regenerate combat power faster than it is destroyed. Meanwhile, wartime learning cycles in domains such as unmanned systems and electronic warfare are measured in weeks, contrasting with Western procurement models built around decade-long, platform‑centric programmes.
Together, these shifts compel Western militaries to reset doctrine and procurement for an age of attrition, as well as to make resilience, surge capacity and rapid replenishment explicit contractual deliverables.
Research lines: Eurasia; Europe
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